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PREFACE 
This volume is the result of a conference held at the Hoover Institution, 
Stanford University, September 17-19, 1987. Over 30 persons with ex-
pertise in the Latin American debt problem attended, including bankers, 
representatives of international financial agencies, government officials, 
academics, and Latin American economists. 
Conferences (and books) on the Third World debt problem, which is 
largely Latin American, have· been numerous. It was the aim of the 
Hoover Institution conference to give more emphasis than usual to the 
Latin American and political side of the problem, while taking into ac-
count the role of the financial actors, and to think as far as possible in 
terms of a solution, or at least an outcome, to the problem. This focus 
led to illuminating exchanges of information and ideas from different 
points of view. 
Despite their different backgrounds, conferees seemed to be in more 
agreement than disagreement. However, there was vigorous debate on 
the merits of a strategy of "muddling through," or proposing incre-
mental adjustments as opposed to a global restructuring of the inter-
national lending system, for example through an institution for the 
assumption of Third World obligations. 
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BASED GROWTH 
Robert E. Looney 
PHASES OF MEXICAN DEVELOPMENT 
Many observers trace the current debt crisis back to the administration 
of Luis Echeverria, who was in office from 1970 to 1976. Basic dilemmas 
in his economic policy included the desire to use fiscal policy to reform 
the social structure without creating an adequate tax base; the desire to 
raise exports while maintaining a fixed exchange rate in the face of 
accelerating inflation; the desire to strengthen public sector enterprises 
while trying to maintain their prices at unrealistically low levels; and 
striving for greater industrial efficiency under a policy of protectionism.1 
The result was that the public sector deficit expanded to 9.5 percent in 
1976, and by 1976 Mexico's public foreign debt was $20 billion. These 
alternative means of supporting Echeverria' s policy of shared develop-
ment proved unsustainable, however; in 1975 the development strategy 
collapsed.2 
Jose L6pez Portillo, who was in office from 1976 to 1982, began his 
administration with an IMF stabilization program and a promise of struc-
tural change. Once the petroleum revenues began surging, however, 
attempts at stabilization were abandoned as Lopez Portillo decided to 
spend his way out of trouble through a massively expensive develop-
ment program. As the oil revenues increased, foreign borrowing also 
accelerated, and control over spending became increasingly lax. 3 Instead 
of cutting back expenditures in the wake of the 1981 decline in oil rev-
enues (which reached only $14.5 billion instead of the $20 billion pro-
jected in the budget), the government continued its spending by even 
heavier foreign borrowing, mainly of a. short-term nature. By the end 
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of 1981, the public sector foreign debt jumped to $53 billion, of which 
$14.5 billion was scheduled for repayment in 1982.4 
DEALING WITH THE DEBT 
During the 1983-85 period, there was significant progress in lowering 
the relative value of the public debt. 5 The domestic public debt, after 
having increased 60 percent in real terms during 1982, fell 30 percent 
between 1983 and 1985, and the public sector deficit decreased from 18 
percent of the GDP to 9.9 percent. Also during this period, foreign public 
debt, in relation to the GDP, fell from 43.9 to 40.6 percent. This reflects 
a decline in the growth rate of net borrowing, which fell from levels 
surpassing 7 percent of the GDP in 1981 to 3.1 percent in 1983, 1.5 
percent in 1984, and 0.4 percent in 1985. 
The country has also made important improvements in public fi-
nances, in trimming the size of government and increasing efficiency in 
public enterprises. 6 The largest part of the reduction in the fiscal deficit 
came from cuts in government spending on goods and services before 
interest payments; spending has declined almost 8 percentage points of 
the GDP since 1981. The system of state subsidies was also completely 
revised. Between 1982 and 1985, government transfers to public com-
panies in real terms declined by 40 percent. Also, an effort has been 
made to reduce the gap between the general price levels for consumer 
goods and the prices of public goods and services, especially in energy. 
Subsidies on gas, electricity, mass transportation, and basic foods are 
being phased out. 
To stop capital flight, the government has set interest rates well above 
the inflation rate. The authorities have created incentives for export-
oriented companies and companies generating new jobs. They are also 
divesting many state-run firms. 
On another front, the government has enjoyed some succ~ss in its 
debt-capitalization program. 7 Launched in June 1986, this program al-
lows debt to be converted into capital by foreign investors. Conversion 
is authorized if the applicant can persuade the government that it will 
create new jobs, increase exports, or introduce advanced technology 
with its investment. Depending on the nature of the project, the debt 
is exchanged for pesos at 76 to 100 percent of face value. By late 1986, 
some $200 million in external debt had been converted under this system. 
Debt-for-equity agreements amounted to $850 million in foreign in-
vestment in the last nine months of 1986. Primarily because of fears of 
inflation, the program ceiling for 1987 has been set at $1.5 billion.8 Op-
timists contend that this program could liquidate 8 percent of Mexico's 
external debt and that the country, by offeqng discounts of 5 to 25 
percent to foreign investors wishing to purchase shares in 55 state-run 
firms that currently face indebtedness and liquidity problems, could get 
rid of a major source of federal budgetary deficits. 9 It is not at all clear, 
however, that the program will make more than a token dent in the 
country's external debt. 10 At most, foreign bankers and Finance Ministry 
officials estimate the debt swaps will retire about $3 or $4 billion of 
Mexican debt. 
Finally, by joining the GAIT, the country hopes to increase trade with 
the United States, which already accounts for 60 percent of its total trade, 
and to expand and diversify trade with Europe. Major measures under 
the GAIT agreement include:11 (1) a protection system that relies pri-
marily on tariffs, in contrast to the previous structure that relied mainly 
on import licenses; and (2) cutting maximum import tariffs from 100 to 
45 percent in 1986 and 30 percent in 1988. 
THE 1986 RESCUE PACKAGE 
The 1986 crisis initiated widespread debate about the causes, conse-
quences, and costs of the debt. A popular public point of view was that 
Mexico could not and should not have to face more years of harsh 
austerity to satisfy the IMF and commercial bankers, but more conserv-
ative elements of the Mexican government felt that it was critical that 
Mexico meet the demands of the IMF and obtain the loans necessary to 
avoid a default. Others argued that, although the loans were necessary, 
concessions should be made by the IMF and the international banking 
community. This faction maintained that Mexico had attempted to re-
structure its economy and had imposed austerity; the unfortunate col-
lapse of oil prices in 1986, they insisted, should be a responsibility shared 
by the commercial banks and the international financial institutions. 12 
The rescue package called for the commercial banks to generate ap-
proximately $6 billion of new loans. The IMF and World Bank loans 
were contingent on the commercial bank loans being secured. This pack-
age also contained some concessions for Mexico. The World Bank agreed 
to provide additional credit if real economic growth was less than 3.5 
percent in 1987. The IMF loan of $1.6 billion guaranteed additional credit 
if oil prices fell below $9 billion. In exchange for this jumbo loan package, 
the IMF required Mexico to continue to sell off and reduce the number 
of state-owned enterprises, to liberalize trade, to attract more foreign 
investment, and to reduce its domestic deficit by 3 percent of the GDP. 
Critics charge that this package will only address the short-run prob-
lem of servicing immediate debt obligations. It will possibly get Mexico 
through 1987, assuming that the economy generates strong real growth, 
that oil prices stiffen or even increase, that the global economy continues 
to grow, and that interest rates do not rise-all questionable assump-
tions. 
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Critics assert that adding another $12 billion to Mexico's debt will 
merely increase the nation's long-term debt service obligations. More 
importantly, they argue that this loan package will not reverse the trans-
fer of capital from Mexico to the developed nations. Instead it will merely 
perpetuate this negative flow. The critics also warn that it will simply 
draw U.S. banks further into the debt quagmire. Moreover, they argue 
that the Mexican people should not have to suffer through more years 
of austerity and a further decline in their already low standard of living. 
CONCLUSION 
It is apparent that when the new president takes office in late 1988, 
he must tackle the fundamental problem that has confronted the present 
administration as well as its predecessors: how to regain the high rates 
of growth that characterized the Mexican economy over the 1955-70 
period. Since the early 1970s, successive governments have attempted 
to solve this dilemma by either exporting oil or increasing the country's 
external debt. Although there has been some progress in transforming 
the structure of the Mexican economy, there is little reason to believe 
that simply decreasing government expenditures will return the country 
to a self-sustaining high growth plan. As Castaneda notes, whatever 
policies are chosen, Mexico's next president will need all the foreign 
reserves and breathing room that can be obtained. 
In terms of longer-run policies for dealing with the varied issues sur-
rounding the country's external debt, the options appear to be default, 
a further variant of the current Baker-type stabilization program agreed 
to in March 1987, or a combination of these two. 13 The default option 
can probably be rejected out of hand for political reasons, although it is 
not apparent that from a purely economic viewpoint there would be any 
great costs (to Mexico) involved. 14 
Pragmatic Mexicans15 realized some time ago that political and eco-
nomic reforms need to be enacted before the country will be able to 
return to any type of growth path resembling that achieved in the 1955-
70 period. Controls on capital flight, privatization of inefficient and cor-
rupt state-controlled industries, a lowering of trade barriers, tax reform, 
and price controls have been instituted or are being considered. 16 It will 
be politically impossible to fully implement these reforms without a 
significant reduction and eventual elimination of the debt burden. 
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